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Abstract  
Following the implementation in the United Kingdom of the Directive on financial collateral 
arrangements 2002/47/EC, it is extremely difficult - if not simply impossible -  to confine certain 
concepts of law (mainly those of possession and control) within sharp and definitive boundaries.  
Nowadays, the main perception is that there can be different forms of control as well as different 
forms of possession (depending on the type of asset involved and/or the terms and conditions posed by the 
parties to the security agreement).  The article suggests that this ‘flexibility’ is by no means surprising as it 
reflects the tradition, ingrained in English law to continuously stretch the notion of property to accommodate 
market needs.  
 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the concepts of control and possession as 
methods of perfection of a security interest over financial assets, an issue that has given 
rise to considerable discussion among practitioners (but not to the same extent among 
academics1).   
The word ‘perfection’2 is used to describe the various means by which a secured 
creditor can make his/her security interest effective against third parties3.  As a general 
rule, in order to obtain perfection, ‘the law usually requires […] the performance of some 
act which puts third parties on notice of the security interest’.4  In the United Kingdom, 
the most important method of perfection is achieved through registration of the security 
interest in a public record whose main function is to inform the interested parties of the 
existence of charges on the debtor’s assets.5  
                                                 
 Guest Lecturer, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. The author is 
grateful to Professor Micheal Bridge for his valuable comments on the drafts of this article. The author 
would also like to thank Joanna Benjamin, Hugh Beale, Emma Chell, Roy Goode, Louise Gullifer, Eva 
Micheler, Habib Motani, Philip Paech and Babette Pragnell for having taken the time to share their valuable 
experience and give their answers to all the author’s many questions. Any errors are the author’s own. 
1 See, however, the extensive and detailed analysis offered by H. Beale “Financial Collateral” in H. Beale 
and others, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (2nd edn, OUP 2012), at para. 3.47 and L. Gullifer, 
“What Should We Do about Financial Collateral?” (2012) 65 (1) Current Legal Problems, at 377. 
2 The concept of 'perfection' was originally coined in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter 
'UCC') and then gradually gained acceptance outside the United States.  
3 This means that failure to comply with the perfection requirements renders the security interest void in 
the debtor’s insolvency.  Perfection is not a condition of validity of the security interest, but it is essentially 
designed to ensure that third parties are given notice of the existence of encumbrances on assets. See L. 
Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) at para. at para. 2-16 
and E. McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn, Lexis-Nexis 2009), at 689-719.  
4 E. McKendrick, supra n. 3 above, at 689.  
5 Therefore, the duty to register can be described as reflecting ‘the law’s dislike of the secret security interest, 
which leaves the debtor’s property apparently unencumbered,’ R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 
(4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011), at 608.  See also M. G. Bridge, “The Scope and Limits of Security Interests” 
2008 ECFR - Special Volume: The Future of Secured Credit in Europe, 180 and J. Simpson and F. Dahan, 
“Publicity of Security Rights: Why and How” (2005) 1 JIBFL, 3. 
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In 2002 the Directive on financial collateral arrangements 2002/47/EC (hereafter 
‘FCD’)6 was introduced to recognise, for certain forms of investment property the transfer 
of ‘control’ and ‘possession’ as a method of perfection alternative to registration.7  But 
what exactly is meant by the terms ‘possession’ and ‘control’? 
The concept of possession does not seem (at least at first glance) to warrant further 
investigation – being a well developed principle of English property law, traditionally 
confined to the idea of an exclusive and absolute dominium over tangible assets.  The 
main point is that if the creditor has possession there is no need for registration, as 
possession is able to provide sufficient notice of the existence of the charge to the outside 
world.8   
Concerns, however, can be raised when trying to establish the meaning of control, as 
this is a completely new concept for English law. 
One way to think of control is to regard it as the ‘intangible’s equivalent to possession 
of tangibles’9.  This means that control can fulfil the same purpose as possession (i.e. 
excluding others from having control over the asset and consequently putting third parties 
on notice of the charge) but merely for intangibles10.  This approach may have many 
compelling points, yet it does not seem to have been strictly accepted in the United 
Kingdom.  Hence, the next step of this discussion is to seek plausible answers to the 
following questions: (i) what is the precise meaning of control? (ii) does the FCD provide 
a clear definition of this new concept? (iii) what is the solution adopted in the UK? (iv) 
does the new method of perfection (envisaged for financial collateral arrangements) offer 
sufficient notice to third parties?11 
The article intends to evaluate from a theoretical perspective the nature of control and 
possession, in an attempt to identify their key features and determine how these concepts 
can be accommodated into the existing legal framework.  More specifically, it will 
                                                 
6 Directive 2002/47/EC (on Financial Collateral Arrangements) as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC of 
May 6, 2009.  Financial collateral arrangements are typically divided in two categories, title transfer financial 
arrangements (e.g. repurchase agreements) and security financial collateral arrangements (e.g. pledges, liens, 
mortgages or charges). 
7 One of the main purposes of the FCD and the implementing of regulations is to remove the formal 
requirements in the creation and perfection of a financial collateral arrangement’ (Article 3.1 FCD).  The 
aim of this provision is to reduce formalities, cut costs and prevent delays when transferring investment 
securities. 
8 E. McKendrick, supra n. 3, at 689. See also L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, supra n. 3, at para. 
2-20. 
9 J. J. White and R. S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code: Secured Transactions (Hornbook Series, 2000) at 775.  
10 The main point is that a security interest in intangibles cannot be perfected by possession when ‘there is 
no indispensable res to be possessed (like a negotiable instrument)’, J. J. White and R. S. Summers, supra n. 
9, at 775. Nevertheless, ‘some of these intangibles interests can be put under the control of a secured 
creditor to the exclusion of others, and this will put third parties on notice.’, Ibid.  This means that for 
certain forms of intangible property the registration requirement (as a substitute to possession) may be 
deemed unnecessary as control seems to provide notice of the security interest to third parties.  See also M. 
G. Bridge, “The Law Commission’s Proposals for the Reform of Corporate Security Interests” in J. Getzler 
and J. Payne (eds.) Company Charges: Spectrum and Beyond (OUP 2006) at 268 who states that control should 
be ‘to certain forms of intangible property what possession is to tangible property.’ 
11 Over the past fourteen years several attempts have been made in the United Kingdom to answer these 
questions but despite these efforts, certain aspects of uncertainty have remained unresolved.  A clarification 
on these points is now, more than ever, necessary in view of the new EU regulatory framework in the area 
of derivatives markets, which will most likely lead to an increase in the use of financial collateral 
arrangements.  Security financial collateral arrangements are considered critical to the liquidity of the 
financial markets and to financial stability.  The Financial Market Law Committee (“FMLC”) has recently 
argued that the volume of these types of transactions is likely to increase as a result of the regulatory changes 
brought about by Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 (“EMIR”). See on this point FMLC, Meaning of "possession", 
"control" and "excess financial collateral" under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003, 13 April 
2015 (hereafter ‘FMLC 2015’), at para. 5. 
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endeavour to respond to the four questions listed above and overall will demonstrate that 
the implementation of the FCD in the United Kingdom must lead us to reconsider the 
traditional perception of certain principles of property law, mainly those of possession 
and publicity.   
The argument presented here is that possession can no longer be defined in terms of 
an absolute dominium over material things, as nowadays such a concept can also be 
extended to intangibles and does not necessarily imply a form of ‘exclusive’ control over 
the asset.  Similarly, the concept of publicity (typically associated to the perfection of a 
security interest) does not have to provide stricto sensu notice to the world at large, as there 
may be circumstances in which such notice is not ‘public’ (being limited to certain 
categories of third parties) and where the existence of a security interest is not even visible 
(meaning that the information on a charge can only be obtained through an intermediary). 
This occurrence is not at all surprising, however, as it confirms the distinctive feature 
of English property law and its ability to adapt and address market needs by frequently 
stretching and repositioning the boundaries of well-established principles rather than 
creating exceptions or novel concepts of law.  
The analysis takes into consideration particular types of financial assets which are 
covered by the FCD, i.e. indirectly held securities.  The expression ‘indirectly held 
securities’ refers to assets that are held by investors indirectly, i.e. through one or more 
intermediaries (such as financial institutions, brokers, depositories and other professional 
investors).12  The use of these types of assets usually involves an electronic system, 
whereby the interest of the investor is represented by a credit entry to his/her securities 
account13 and transfers of securities are made in the same way as bank funds transfer (i.e. 
by debit and credit entries to such accounts).14  Both the widespread use, in market 
practice, of these types of assets and the complexity of their structure makes them a very 
interesting platform for evaluating the meanings of control and possession as methods of 
perfection of a security interest. 
 
B. The compound meaning of control 
 
 It is possible to identify different types of control, according to two main sets of 
distinctions.15  Firstly, control may be either positive or negative: ‘positive control is the 
ability to remove an asset from the collateral pool and negative control is the ability to 
                                                 
12 The central point of this practice is that investors may be separated from the issuer of the underlying 
securities by multiple layers of intermediaries (often spanning a number of jurisdictions).  This means that, 
in a very simplified scenario, an intermediary in the highest tier of the holding chain (typically a central 
securities depository – CSD, but not necessarily in all jurisdictions) holds for a second-tier intermediary, the 
second-tier intermediary holds for a third-tier intermediary and so on down the chain to the ultimate 
investor. 
13 Nowadays, securities are issued and transferred by means of intangible electronic records rather than 
paper certificates, as was once the norm. Starting from the early 1970s in the United States and the 1980s 
in the United Kingdom, the physical delivery of paper documents was largely replaced by electronic 
settlement, which involves a technique called ‘book-entry transfer’.  For an analysis of this practice see, 
among others, J. Benjamin, Interest in Securities. A Property Law Analysis of the International Securities Markets 
(OUP 2000, at 3 - 59 and M. Yates and G. Montagu (4th edn, Tottel Publishing, 2013), at 1 - 39. 
14 Consistently with this practice, the credit of securities to the account held by an intermediary confers on 
the investor the right both to dispose of the securities and to receive the corporate and economic benefits 
attached to the financial assets.   
15 H. Beale “Financial Collateral” in H. Beale and others, supra n. 1, at paras. 3.33 – 3.43.  On this point see 
also J. Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP 2007) at para. 20.117 - n. 192; J. Benjamin, “Securities Collateral” in 
J. de Lacy (ed.), The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law Comparative Perspectives (Routledge – Cavendish 
2009) at 258 – 259 and A. Zacaroli, “Taking Security over Intermediated Securities: Chapter V of the 
Unidroit (Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities in over Intermediated Securities” in L. Gullifer 
& J. Payne (eds.), Intermediated Securities. Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) at 184.   
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prevent an asset from being so removed’.16  Secondly, ‘either positive or negative control 
may be legal (i.e., the right to remove or prevent removal as the case may be) or 
operational (i.e., the practical ability to remove or prevent removal, by account entry or 
otherwise).’17  In other words, legal control is the ‘right’ of the secured party to dispose 
(positive control) or to prevent disposal (negative control) of the collateral and is achieved 
by way of a contractual agreement between the debtor and the secured creditor.  
Alternatively or cumulatively, operational control is the ‘practical ability’ of the secured 
party to ‘control’ the delivery of the assets.  This situation typically occurs when the debtor 
and the secured creditor agree to transfer the collateral into the account of the secured 
party (rather than leaving the securities credited in the debtor’s account).  By doing so, 
the secured party is in a practical (de facto) position to either dispose of the securities 
(positive control) or prevent any other person from dealing with those assets (negative 
control).  Operational or practical control may be acquired by the secured party, despite 
the concomitant existence of a legal control over the collateral.  This means that the 
secured party may have a practical ability to ‘remove or prevent removal’18 of the collateral 
from the account, ‘whether or not in doing so it would be in breach of its contractual 
obligations to the debtor’.19 
This interpretation of the notion of control shows that in the practice of indirectly held 
securities it is possible to identify multiple forms of control, whose content is liable to 
change significantly according to the circumstances: control may be positive and/or 
negative as well as operational and/or legal.  This means that (consistent with the concept 
of property) the notion of control is composed of ‘building bricks, which can be used and 
put together in different ways’.20 
The core idea is that there is no absolute or single definition of control because this 
concept comprises different features that can be combined in a number of ways 
depending on the intention of the parties.  Indeed, a closer look at the practice of 
indirectly held securities shows that parties may choose from at least seven different 
combinations.21 
 
Practical, legal, negative and positive control 
 
The first combination comprises all four types of control, i.e. legal and practical control 
as well as positive and negative.  This particular situation is the ‘safest’ way of creating a 
security interest over the collateral and it consists both of (i) transferring the securities 
into an account ‘controlled’ by the secured creditor and of (ii) conferring to such party 
the contractual right to dispose, and to prevent any other person from disposing, of the 
collateral.  Even though it confers the maximum degree of control to the creditor, in 
practice this combination is likely to be preferred in full-title transactions. 
                                                 
16 J. Benjamin, Financial Law, supra n. 15, at para. 20.117. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., at para. 20.117.  See also H. Beale, “Perfection of Security Interests Over Financial Collateral” in H. 
Beale and others, The Law of Personal Property Security (OUP 2007), at paras 10.18 – 10-35 and L. Gullifer, 
Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, supra n. 3, at paras. 4–22 and 6-32. 
19 FMLC, Issue 87 Control Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd, December 2010 (hereafter ‘FMLC 2010’), para. 6.10.  In 
other words, in this case there is a need to obtain some form of action by the creditor in order to remove 
the collateral from the account (notwithstanding the debtor’s contractual right to dispose of the collateral). 
20 The expression was originally coined with regard to the traditional proprietary rights of enjoyment, 
alienation and possession. In other words, it referred to the ‘bundle of rights’ that may be exercised by the 
rightful owner or possessor with respect to a ‘thing’.  On this point see A. P. Bell, Modern Law of Personal 
Property in England and Ireland (Butterworths 1989) at 5.  The main objective of using this expression was to 
highlight the fact that the same bundle of rights is not necessarily attached to all forms of property.  This 
‘flexible’ idea of property can also be detected when analysing the concept of control.      
21 The author is grateful to Habit Motani and Emma Chell for describing these different combinations. 
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Practical, negative and positive control 
 
The second combination is acquired when the collateral is transferred into the creditor’s 
account but the debtor maintains the right to remove the collateral at any time prior to 
enforcement.  In this case, the creditor is in a ‘de facto’ (but not legal) position to sell or 
transfer the collateral and to prevent the debtor from exercising his/her contractual rights 
over the collateral.22 
 
Practical, legal and positive control 
 
The third combination comprises three types of control, i.e. practical, legal and positive.  
In practice, this means that the collateral is transferred to the account of the secured party 
who has also acquired a contractual right to sell or transfer these assets without further 
consent from the debtor. 
 
Practical, legal and negative control 
 
Consistent with the third combination, in this fourth case the secured party enjoys both 
practical and legal control.  The main difference between these two combinations is that 
in the latter case, unlike in the former, the secured party has a contractual right to prevent 
the debtor from dealing with the charged assets (negative control) rather than a right to 
dispose of the collateral (positive control). 
 
Legal and positive control 
Legal and negative control 
Legal, positive and negative control 
 
Each of the last three combinations is characterised by the fact that the collateral is left 
credited on the debtor’s account.  Thus, in these cases the secured party only remains in 
a legal position (and not a practical one) to dispose of the collateral (‘legal and positive 
control’), to prevent others from disposing of such assets (‘legal and negative control’) or 
to exercise both options (‘legal, positive and negative’). 
The number of these different forms of control is increased even further owing to the 
existence of multiple degrees of legal control, whether positive or negative.  For example, 
in cases of negative control, the debtor may undergo an absolute preclusion from dealing 
with the collateral or, alternatively, be restricted to exercising only limited rights (such as 
the right of substitution or to withdraw excess financial collateral).23  Similarly, in cases of 
positive control the secured creditor may obtain either unlimited or more restricted rights 
to sell or transfer the collateral.24 
These examples provide further evidence of the compound nature of control, in terms 
of the creditor’s ability to exclude others from using and enjoying the collateral.  A careful 
analysis of the functioning of this new concept has shown that it is generally possible to 
identify multiple forms of control, where the content may vary significantly.  Hence, one 
                                                 
22 With this type of combination, the debtor is not in a position to automatically access those securities, 
without the practical emphasis added involvement of the creditor (or of a person acting on the creditor’s 
behalf).  For an example of this scenario, see the case Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch). 
23 See infra text to nn. 28 – 29. 
24 Moreover, in the case of negative control the debtor’s right of disposal may be subject either to prior 
authorisation by the creditor for each transaction or, alternatively, to a general authorisation released at the 
time of creating a security interest. 
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of the main issues is to establish which of these forms of control is envisaged under the 
FCD. 
 
C. The uneasy case for understanding the meaning of ‘control’ under the FCD 
 
 The FCD25 does not define what constitutes ‘control’ and this uncertainty leaves ample 
room for debate.26  Initially the discussion was focused primarily on the first set of 
distinctions, in an attempt to understand whether EU law contemplates negative control, 
positive control or both.  The wording seems to suggest that ‘negative control’ alone is 
probably sufficient to satisfy the perfection requirement, while ‘positive control’ alone is 
not.27  This interpretation relies on Recital 10 in the Preamble to the FCD, which states 
that the directive covers ‘only those financial collateral arrangements, which provide for 
some form of dispossession’. 
The rationale behind the dispossession requirement is to prevent the debtor from 
having control of the assets and hence from transferring or delivering them to third 
parties.  If the debtor retains the ability to deal with the financial collateral, it cannot be 
considered as dispossessed.28 
The last sentence of Article 2(2) of the FCD seems to confirm this analysis when it 
specifies that any right of the debtor to substitute financial collateral or withdraw excess 
financial collateral shall not prevent the secured creditor from being in possession or 
having control of the assets.  If the intention under the FCD were to contemplate the 
possibility of the debtor’s disposing of the collateral this provision would be unnecessary, 
as the right of substitution or the possibility to withdraw excess financial collateral should 
be included in the debtor’s retention of the right to trade the financial collateral.  Thus, 
the clarification under Article 2(2) would be superfluous for cases in which the debtor 
had such a power and ‘one would expect there to be some reference to that, but there is 
none’.29 
                                                 
25 In June 2009, the EC Directive 2009/44 ‘amending Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment 
and securities settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements as regards 
linked systems and credit claims’ was officially published in the EU Official Journal (‘EC Directive 
2009/44’). With respect to financial collateral arrangements the objective was to expand the number of 
financial claims which can be collateralised. The main amendment to the FCD is the inclusion of credit 
claims eligible for the collateralisation of central bank credit operations, which are defined as ‘pecuniary 
claims arising out of an agreement whereby a credit institution [...] grants credit in the form of a loan.’ 
26 The literature on the meaning of control under the FCD has been quite productive.  For an analysis see, 
for example, S. Goldsworthy, “Taking possession and control to excess: issues with financial collateral 
arrangements under English law” (2013) J.I.B.F.L. 71; E. Chell and others, “Possession and control: 
financial collateral remains a Gray area” (2013) 1 JIBFL 43; D. Saoul, “Lehman: liens untied” (2013) JIBFL 
3, 143; L. Gullifer, “What should we do about financial collateral?”, supra n. 1, 377; D. Turing, “New Growth 
In The Financial Collateral Garden” (2005) 1 JIBFL 4; R. McCormick, “EU Directive on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements: Replies of a Working Group of the CLLS Financial Law Committee to the Questionnaire 
of February 2006 to the Private Sector From the European Commission for the Drafting of the Evaluation 
Report” (2006) 6 JIBFL 263; A. Fawcett, “The Financial Collateral Directive: an examination of some 
practical problems following its implementation in the UK” (2005) JIBLR 95 and H. Beale, “Reform of the 
Law of Security – Another View” (2004) 4 JIBFL 117.  
27 See on this point English Law Commission Company Security Interests, Report No 296, 2005 (hereafter 
‘English Law Commission (2005)’), at paras 5.46 – 5.50 and L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, 
supra n. 3 at para. 6-35. 
28 On this point, see English Law Commission (2005), paras. 5.52 – 5.54; L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems 
of Credit, supra n. 3 at para. 6-35.  
29 English Law Commission (2005), at para 5.54.  There is also another provision in the FCD that is often 
mentioned to confirm this approach, i.e. the provision on enforcement (Art. 4 (1) FCD.  For an analysis 
see H. Beale, “Perfection of Security Interests Over Financial Collateral” in H. Beale and others., The Law 
of Personal Property Security, supra n. 18 at para. 10-31.  See also English Law Commission (2005) at paras. 5.54 
- 5.55. 
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This interpretation has recently been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘CJEU’) in its first (and only) ruling on the notion of control and possession under 
the FCD.  More specifically, in its decision of November 2016 the CJEU confirms the 
idea that the test of ‘possession’ and ‘control’ of the secured creditor under Article 2(2) 
of the FCD is satisfied only in those circumstances where the debtor is deprived of the 
ability to dispose of the financial collateral30.  This situation occurs when the secured 
creditor has either negative control alone, or both negative and positive control, but it 
does not allow for what is usually called ‘positive control without negative control’. 
The approach that appears to be adopted by the FCD is not in line with US law, which 
was the first legal system to introduce, under Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code 
(hereafter 'UCC') - in connection with the 1994 revision to Article 8 UCC regarding 
investment property - the concept of control as a method of perfection of a security 
interest.  Indeed, the idea set out under revised Article 8 UCC, is that ‘positive control’ 
alone may be sufficient to perfect a security interest.  More specifically, in Comment 7 to 
§ 8-106 UCC, the Drafting Committee for the revision to Article 8 argues that the key to 
the control concept is the ability of the purchaser or the secured creditor to have the 
securities sold or transferred without further action by the owner.31  In particular, under 
certain circumstances there is no requirement that the powers held by the purchaser or 
the secured creditor be exclusive, as the owner may have concomitant rights to substitute, 
to receive dividends and distributions, as well as to trade those securities.32 
Unlike Article 8 UCC, the FCD does not provide guidelines clarifying what amounts 
to ‘control’, although the leading opinion among academics and practitioners is to 
interpret the wording of the directive in the negative (rather than positive) sense.33 
With respect to the second set of distinctions, the FCD does not provide clear answers 
as to whether it includes situations of practical control and/or legal control.  The wording 
in the directive suggests that a combination of ‘legal control’ and ‘practical control’ can 
indeed satisfy the perfection requirement, while ‘practical control’ alone is not sufficient.  
This interpretation relies on Article 2(2) of the FCD which prevents the debtor from 
retaining a general right [emphasis added] to trade the charged assets (with the exception 
of a right of substitution or withdrawal of excess collateral).  Such a limitation on the 
debtor’s right [emphasis added] to dispose of the asset is inconsistent with a scenario where 
the collateral is transferred into the creditor’s account but the debtor retains the right 
[emphasis added] to remove the collateral at any time prior to enforcement (i.e. practical 
control without legal control).34 
A more difficult aspect to establish is whether legal control alone can be considered 
sufficient to satisfy the perfection requirement.  There seem to be different views on this 
point35, given that the wording of the FCD has proven (once again) to be somewhat 
                                                 
30 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS [2016] EUECJ C-156/15 (10 November 2016). 
31 Official Comment § 8-106 UCC at para. 7.  
32 § 8-106 (f) UCC. 
33 See among others see H. Beale “Financial Collateral” in H. Beale and others, supra n. 1 at para. 3.47. 
34 This has recently been confirmed in the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar delivered on 21 July 2016 
in relation to case C‑156/15 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS at para. 51.  See on this point 
also Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd, EWHC 1772 (Ch) at para. 54 and Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In 
Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), at para. 131.  Unlike the FCD, Article 8 UCC does include practical 
control alone, S. L. Harris and C. W. Mooney, Security Interest in Personal Property. Cases, Problems and Materials 
(4th edn, Foundation Press 2006), at 435. 
35 L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, supra n. 3 at para. 6–36. 
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arduous to interpret and the recent CJEU pronouncement is unfortunately silent on this 
point36. 
Several years have passed since the entry into force of the FCD within the European 
Union but doubts still remain concerning the different forms of control that can be used 
in the case of perfection.  The discussion so far seems to suggest that at least two 
combinations of control should fall within the scope of the FCD and that three are 
certainly to be excluded.  The combinations that are accepted under the FCD consist of 
(i) practical, legal, negative and positive control and (ii) practical, legal and negative 
control.  On the other hand, those forms that do not seem to be consistent with the 
wording of the Directive are (iii) practical, negative and positive control, (iv) practical, 
legal and positive control and (v) legal and positive control. 
The problem still exists for the last two combinations, given that there is no explicit 
indication in the Directive as to whether (vi) legal and negative control and (vii) legal, 
positive and negative control are considered valid methods of perfection of a security 
interest.  These considerations make it necessary to determine whether English law has 
managed to cast light on this matter, by identifying which of the different forms of control 
can be applied in practice. 
 
D. The UK’s approach on financial collateral arrangements 
 
The FCD was implemented in the United Kingdom with the 2003 Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations (hereafter ‘FCAR’) and subsequently amended by the 
2010 Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral 
Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations (hereafter ‘FMIR’).  Regulation 3 (2) of the 
FCAR offers a very restrictive interpretation of Article 2(2) of the FCD37.  In particular, 
it states that perfection of a security interest can be achieved only in those cases where 
the 'financial collateral has been credited to an account in the name of the [secured 
creditor] or a person acting on his behalf […] provided that any rights the [debtor] may 
have in relation to that financial collateral are limited to the right to substitute financial 
collateral of the same or greater value or to withdraw excess financial collateral’.38 
This means that for the purposes of the FCAR the debtor is deprived of the power to 
dispose of the collateral, being admitted to exercise only exceptional interests, i.e. 'the 
right to substitute financial collateral of the same or greater value or to withdraw excess 
financial collateral'.39  The inclusion of these limited rights under Regulation 3 (2) of the 
FCAR was the result of the decision to comply with the FCD where it specifies that any 
right of substitution or withdrawal of excess financial collateral in favour of the debtor 
shall not prevent the secured creditor from being in possession or having control of the 
asset.40 
Looking at this provision, it could be argued at first glance that English law seems to 
accept only the first two combinations of control, i.e. practical, legal, negative and positive 
control as well as practical, legal and negative control.  This initial perception, however, is 
partially misleading given that although Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR contemplates the 
                                                 
36 HM Treasury, Consultation Paper, Implementation of EU Directive 2009/44/EC on settlement finality and financial 
collateral arrangements, August 2010 (hereafter ‘HM Treasury August 2010’) at para. 3.3.   
37 The FCAR was recently amended by the 2010 Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and 
Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations (hereafter 'FMIR').  The intention was 
primarily to implement the EC Directive 2009/44 within the United Kingdom so as to expand the FCD’s 
scope of application to cover credit claims. However, the drafting of the FMIR was also an opportunity to 
overcome at least part of the uncertainties or the limitations concealed in the wording of the FCD. 
38 Reg. 3(2) FCAR 
39 Ibid. 
40 Art. 2(2) FCD.  
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first two combinations as a valid method of perfection, it does not include them within 
the meaning of control but rather within the concept of possession.  More specifically, it 
introduces a new definition of possession that applies specifically to investment securities 
and that includes the case where the financial collateral is transferred onto the creditor's 
account and the debtor is prevented from having unrestricted rights over the assets. 
 
D.1 The new concept of possession: a critical analysis 
 
The recognition of a new definition of possession seems to contradict the idea that 
‘possession has no meaning [...] as regards intangible property’41 and that control should 
be considered as the 'intangible's equivalent to possession of tangibles'.42  Although the 
solution to apply the notion of possession to investment securities was warmly welcomed 
by most market players,43 it does not seem to be completely in line with the conventional 
way of interpreting this concept. 
Prior to the introduction of the FCAR, it was widely accepted in English law that ‘in 
the case of intangible personal property, possession is impossible’.44  The reason for this 
is that ‘rights in these choses in action [as opposed to those in choses in possession] have 
to be asserted through the medium of legal action’.45  This is particularly emphasised by 
Lawson and Rudden, when they argue that ‘[t]he rules governing the recovery of property 
vary with the nature of the property’46: ‘[s]ome kinds of property can be possessed, others 
cannot’.47 
Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR overrides these common law requirements by 
introducing a new idea of possession, which applies to investment securities.  The issue 
was also addressed in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) which 
concerned the interpretation of the FCD and FCAR.  In his decision, Briggs J. confirms 
the idea that ‘it would be wrong to limit possession in such a way as to exclude any 
application to intangibles’.48 
It is difficult to understand the reasons that lie behind this position.  For the purposes 
of Art. 2(1) of the FCD, ‘financial collateral’ includes both bearer securities in certificated 
form (which are treated as tangibles) as well as securities in dematerialised form.  Thus, 
there is no inconsistency with the scope of the directive in using the notion of possession 
for tangibles as well as for documentary intangibles and the notion of control for all other 
intangibles.  If the intention in the directive is to apply the concept of possession to all 
types of collateral, what reason would there be to add the concept of control as a new 
method of perfection? 
                                                 
41 Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd, EWHC 1772 (Ch) at para. 54. 
42 J. J. White and R. S. Summers, supra n. 9 at 775.  See supra text to nn. 8 and 10. 
43 R. Parsons and M. Denning, “Financial collateral – an opportunity missed” (2010) 5 (3) May Law & Fin. 
Mkt. Rev. 164.  See also FMLC, Implementation of EU Directive 2009/44/EC on settlement finality and financial 
collateral arrangements, April 2011. 
44 M. G. Bridge, Personal Property Law (3rd edn, OUP 2002) at 15 and 144.  See also the 4th and latest edition 
of this book at page 15.  Recently, this principle has been confirmed in Your Response Ltd v. Datateam Business 
Media Ltd 2014 EWCA Civ. 281 where the Court of Appeal strengthens the idea that while ‘possession is 
concerned with the physical control of tangible objects’, ‘practical control is a broader concept, capable of 
extending to intangible assets and to things which the law would not regard as property at all’, ibid., para. 
23.  Interestingly, in this case no reference is made to Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR.     
45 Ibid.  See also F. H. Lawson and B. Rudden, The Law of Property (2nd edn, OUP 1982) at 20 and M. G. 
Bridge, supra n. 44, at 15. 
46 F. H. Lawson and B. Rudden, supra n. 45 at 40. 
47 Ibid.  
48 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at para. 131.  ‘Intangibles’, Briggs continues, ‘are, and were by the time the 
Directive was being prepared, the very stuff of modern financial collateral’, ibid.  For a different view on 
this point see Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd, EWHC 1772 (Ch) at para. 54.   
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The new idea of possession, which applies to all types of collateral (regardless of their 
nature) is consistent with the the Financial Market Law Committee (hereafter ‘FMLC’)'s 
view that ‘possession of securities’ should not refer exclusively to bearer securities in 
certificated form but should be extended to securities in dematerialised form.49 
Although the FMLC makes a valuable comment where it states that nowadays bearer 
securities issued in the form of a paper instrument are rarely used in practice,50 it does not 
provide a convincing argument for having to apply the notion of possession to all types 
of collateral.51 
A more appropriate way to interpret the scope of the directive would be, in a sense, to 
allow EU Member States to choose between different options: either extend the meaning 
of possession to include intangible assets or introduce the concept of control which is 
specifically addressed to cover intangibles.  Consistent with this reasoning, the scope of 
the directive is simply to set out a new method of perfection for financial collaterals, 
leaving the decision of naming it to the Member States.   
The author believes this interpretation to be the most convincing for two main reasons. 
Firstly, if we look at the travaux préparatoires of the FCD it is clear that one of the major 
challenges faced by EU authorities during the negotiation process was to strike a balance 
between creating a uniform framework for financial collateral arrangements on the one 
hand, and minimising interference in the laws of Member States on the other52. 
Traditionally, property law has been one of the areas in which EU harmonisation has 
encountered the strongest resistance by Member States and therefore it is also where the 
differences among national laws remain significant.53  This explains why throughout the 
process of the drafting of a new (and more efficient) regime on financial collaterals, EU 
authorities have tried (as much as possible) to use ‘neutral language’, striving to avoid 
terminology or forms which are strictly linked to national legal systems.  In this context, 
it is probably no coincidence that references to possession (which is one of the oldest and 
well established concepts of property law) did not appear in the earlier versions of the 
draft of the directive, as it was added together with ‘control’, at the very final stages of the 
legislative process54.  The purpose of this amendment in the draft of the directive was not 
necessarily to impose on Member States the introduction of a new meaning of possession 
but simply to explain the exact steps that should be taken when perfecting a security 
                                                 
49 FMLC 2010, para 4.8.  According to the FMLC, 'the concept of possession has an "autonomous" meaning 
in EU law and it must be interpreted in accordance with the wording of the directive rather than with 
general principles of English law', ibid. 
50 See on this point also Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), 
at para. 131).  This point has even greater value if we consider certain changes introduced in the UK by the 
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 which (as from May 2015) prohibits companies from 
using bearer shares.  The idea behind the abolition of bearer shares was to increase corporate transparency.  
51 FMLC 2010, at paras. 4.6-4.8.  The fact that paper-based securities are scarcely used in practice does not 
prevent us from stating firstly, that these types of assets are included within the scope of Art. 2(1) of the 
FCD and secondly, that the wording of the directive is certainly not in contrast with the idea of possession 
referring merely to tangibles. 
52 This was expressly stated by the European Commission in the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on financial collateral arrangements /COM/2001/0168 final – COD 
2001/0086 / Explanatory Memorandum, at para. 2.3. 
53 For example, see on this point the long-standing debate as to whether or not Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 
295 EC) represents an obstacle to the development of a European property law, B. Akkermans and E. 
Ramaekers, “Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meanings and Interpretations” (2010) 16 (3) 
European Law Journal, 292.  
54 Compare, for example, the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
financial collateral arrangements (COM (2001) 168 - 2001/0086 (COD) of 27 March 2001 with the 
Common Position (EC) No 32/2002 adopted by the Council on 5 March 2002 with a view to adopting the 
directive on financial collateral arrangements (2002/C 119 E/03) of 5 March 2002.  
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interest over financial collaterals55.  In support of this argument it is worth noting that the 
words ‘possession/control’ are mentioned in the directive using the conjunction ‘or’ 
rather than ‘and’ (i.e. using the expression ‘possession or control’ instead of ‘possession 
and control’) which confirms the intention of leaving to Member States the task of 
deciding which ‘label’ or ‘form’ to use when having to describe the new method of 
perfection set out under the FCD56.  
Secondly, such an interpretation can to some extent help us overcome certain apparent 
inconsistencies in the EU legislation, mainly the fact that Recital 10 in the Preamble 
merely refers to ‘some form of dispossession’ omitting to mention control and that (as 
from the 2009 amendment to the FCD57) Recital 9 only makes reference to control.  These 
inconsistencies can only be overcome by accepting the view that the expression 
‘possession or control’ does not necessarily refer to two separate concepts and as such it 
needs to be interpreted as a ‘composite phrase’58 intended simply to reflect the different 
terms and concepts used by Member States through domestic legislation. 
If this position were accepted, it is possible to argue that for the purpose of legal 
taxonomy in English law it would have been better to avoid using the concept of 
possession for intangibles as this can potentially lead to confusion, dictating the need for 
the creation of different forms of possession (depending on the nature of the collateral).  
Indeed, possession over tangibles is merely linked to the idea of an exclusive and absolute 
dominium over things which is not necessarily the only condition that the market is willing 
to require when perfecting a security interest over intermediated securities.  On the other 
hand, the notion of control is designed to offer a more flexible approach that can be easily 
accommodated to the modern securities market, as it applies to a wider range of 
situations59 (some of which draw closer to possession60 but others clearly do not61). 
The choice of confining the notion of possession to tangibles and to documentary 
intangibles and to use the notion of control for intangibles seems to be more in line with 
the US law where it states that ‘security interests in intangibles for which there is no 
indispensable res to be possessed (like a negotiable instrument) cannot be perfected by 
possession’.62  These forms of intangibles are perfected, under Articles 9 and 8 of the 
                                                 
55 See the European Parliament’s Report on the proposal for a directive on financial collateral arrangements 
(COM (2001) 168 – 2001/0086 COD) of 23 November 2001.  In the final version of Article 2 of the FCD 
the perfection requirements are described in paragraph 2 by stating that the collateral should be “delivered, 
transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of 
the collateral taker or of a person acting on the collateral taker's behalf”.  In this context, reference to 
‘possession or control’ was added merely to clarify the exact position that the secured creditor needs to 
achieve on the collateral, when having the latter ‘delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise 
designated’ 
56 The idea in favour of conferring a wider margin of discretion on Member States (when having to interpret 
the expression ‘possession or control’) is consistent with Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU) which states that unlike regulations, the function of directives is to bind merely ‘as to the 
result to be achieved’, leaving ‘to the national authorities the choice of forms and methods’.  See also Recital 
22 of the Preamble which states that the FCD introduces minimum harmonization in the area of financial 
collateral arrangements.  Cfr. n. 92.  
57 See supra n. 25. 
58 The expression ‘composite phrase’ was coined by Beale when interpreting the meaning of ‘possession or 
control’ under the directive.  See on this point H. Beale “Financial Collateral” in H. Beale and others, supra 
n. 1 at para. 3.38. 
59 See supra text to nn. 21 and 24.  
60 See the combinations of (i) practical, legal, negative and positive control and (ii) practical, legal and 
negative control. 
61 See, for example, the combinations of (i) legal and positive control (ii) legal and negative control and (iii) 
practical positive and negative control. 
62 J. J. White and R. S. Summers, supra n. 9 at 775.  
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UCC, by way of ‘control’.63  In particular, Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC expressly states 
that ‘[a] principal purpose of the control concept is to eliminate the uncertainty and 
confusion that results from attempting to apply common law possession concepts to 
modern securities holding practices.’64  This confirms the idea that it would have been 
preferable to avoid using, under Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR, terminology that 
immediately recalls common law possession concepts.  However, English law has chosen 
to take a different path than the UCC.  Hence, whatever requirements common law has 
imposed in defining possession, these have now been overridden by Regulation 3 (2) of 
the FCAR. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, in the author’s view the break from the 
traditional principles of English law (set out under Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR) is not 
as radical as it appears to be on the surface.  The reason for this is that firstly, the outcome 
of this provision confirms a general trend in English property law to respond to market 
needs by adapting (wherever possible) existing principles rather than creating new 
categories of rights.  This approach has been established by courts over the centuries, by 
creating the idea of an equitable ownership under a trust, for example, and by extending 
the category of proprietary rights to include interests over an increasing number of 
intangibles.65  As a result of this trend, it is not at all surprising that the choice in 
Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR has been to stretch the boundaries of possession rather 
than introducing a novel concept such as control66.  Secondly, as mentioned earlier the 
requirements for possession set out under Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR are quite 
restrictive, given that (a) the collateral should be transferred onto the creditors' account 
and (b) it should not be used or enjoyed by the debtor.  This means that the FCAR 
recognises as valid methods of perfection only a very limited number of situations that 
may occur in practice (mainly those that can in some way embrace the traditional features 
of possession).  In this regard, Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR seems to accept the orthodox 
view, which is often stressed by English scholars, that possession ‘is a question of fact as 
                                                 
63 Thus, as for investment securities the UCC provides two principal methods for perfecting a security 
interest, i.e. filing and control (§ 9-312(a) UCC and § 9-314(a) UCC).  In particular, ‘[a]s one might suspect, 
the meaning of control differs depending on whether the collateral is a certificated security, an uncertificated 
security, or a security entitlement. See § 9–104(a) UCC and § 8-106 UCC.  In addition, a security interest in 
a certificated security may be perfected by taking delivery.  See § 9-313 (a) UCC and § 8-301(a) UCC.  In 
the case of a certificated security, delivery [emphasis added] occurs when the secured party acquires 
possession of the security certificate § 8-301(a)(1) UCC’, S. L. Harris and C. W. Mooney, supra n. 38 at 434-
435. 
64 Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC.  
65 See on this point among others S. Worthington, “The Disappearing Divide Between Property and 
Obligation: The Impact of Aligning Legal Analysis and Commercial Expectation” (2006-2007) 42 Tex. Int’l 
L. J. 917.  In support of this argument, it is worth mentioning that English law has chosen to build the legal 
structure of intermediation on the existing principles of trust and sub-trust, rather than introducing (along 
the lines of Article 8 UCC) a statutory reform in this area of law.  Cfr. n. 12. 
66 This flexible approach to property law opens an interesting debate as to what exactly property is today. 
The answer to this query cannot be summarized just in a footnote, as it requires a broader analysis (now 
under preparation).  However, for the purpose of this article it is important to highlight the fact that 
(consistent with the notions of control and possession) the concept of property cannot be analysed by 
simply using a ‘tick box’ approach (as if its features were consistently applicable to all circumstances).  This 
makes it difficult sometimes to set up clear boundaries between proprietary rights on the one hand, and 
contractual rights, on the other.  Nowadays, the only way to distinguish property rights from contractual 
rights is by the fact that the former (unlike the latter) can be enforced against third parties. In support of 
this argument Briggs J. has recently stated that the proprietary nature of an interest depends on the intention 
of the parties: if the purpose was to create a right that is ‘sufficiently strong’ to be asserted erga omnes, then 
such a right can be classified as proprietary.  See on this point Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA 
[2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 225. 
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well as of law’.67  To a certain extent, the meaning of possession under Regulation 3 (2) 
of the FCAR may consist of two essential elements: ‘first the exercise of factual [or 
practical] control over the [assets]’68; and secondly, the ‘concomitant intention to exclude 
others from the exercise of control’69 (i.e. animus possidendi).70  When dealing with indirectly 
held securities, the combination of these two elements is typically reflected in those 
circumstances where (i) the collateral is transferred onto the secured creditor’s account 
and (ii) the debtor is deprived of the power to dispose of such assets, which are 
subsequently ‘blocked’ on the creditor’s account, used or re-hypothecated by the creditor 
itself (subject, of course, to a contractual obligation to redeliver equivalent securities once 
the secured obligation has been performed).71  This scenario resembles the traditional 
meaning of possession to the extent that, as the creditor has ‘exclusive control or 
dominium’ over the assets, there is no risk of such assets being subject to competing 
claims.  However, the FCAR goes further by also including in Regulation 3 (2) a scenario 
where the debtor maintains ‘certain rights over the assets’, i.e. the right to substitute 
equivalent financial collateral or to withdraw excess financial collateral. 
In this particular context, the concept of possession set out under the FCAR differs 
slightly from its traditional meaning given that the collateral seems to have ‘an identity 
distinct from its component parts’72 and therefore the level of control granted to the 
secured creditor over the collateral seems to be less exclusive.  Consistent with the 
wording of Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR, possession is acquired over the assets that from 
time to time are transferred into the creditor’s account rather than on the specific assets 
that were initially included in the collateral.73  Accordingly, provided that the overall value 
of the collateral remains unchanged, the ‘object in possession’ (i.e., the portfolio of assets 
that constitute such collateral) may vary from time to time, like a box whose contents 
change regularly. 
The interpretation of the meaning of possession (offered by Regulation 3 (2) of the 
FCAR) is judged by most market players to be too restrictive.74  On a number of 
occasions, the FMLC stressed the need to introduce more substantive changes (on the 
                                                 
67 F. Pollock and R. S. Wright, An Essay on Possession in Common Law (Clarendon Press 1888) at 10 – 20; L. 
C. Becker, “The Moral Basis of Property Rights” in J. R. Pennock, & J. W. Chapman (eds.), Property, Nomos 
XXII (New York University Press 1980) at 190; O. W. Holmes, The Common Law, edited by M. De Wolfe 
Howe (Little, Brown and Company and Harvard University Press 1963) at 169; M. G. Bridge, Personal 
Property Law (4th edn, OUP 2015), at 33 and J. Benjamin, Financial Law, supra n. 15 at para. 16.07. 
68 Possession involves the physical control of the assets.  As an element of ‘practical’ control, ‘the existence 
of the de facto relation of control or apparent dominion [is] required as the foundation of the alleged 
[proprietary] right’, F. Pollock and R. S. Wright, supra n. 67 at 10.   
69 The expression was used by Bridge with regard to the concept of possession over tangibles. See on this 
point M. G. Bridge, supra n. 67 at 33.  Possession has been described often as ‘one of the most difficult 
concepts in English, or for that matter any other, law’, F. H. Lawson and B. Rudden, supra n. 45 at 41.  The 
reason for this difficulty is that historically the concept of possession has taken many different shapes, 
depending on the circumstances (see among others, on this point R. Harris, “The concept of possession in 
English Law” in A. G. Guest Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 1961) at 69 and F. Pollock and R. S. Wright, 
supra n. 67 at 1 - 10.  A very clear and comprehensive analysis of possession is offered by Frederick Pollock 
in ibid. at 26. 
70 Unlike possession over tangibles, the legal element or animus possidendi set out under Regulation 3 (2) of 
the FCAR needs to be strictly linked to a contractual agreement between the creditor and the debtor which 
prevents the latter from disposing of the collateral.  
71 It should be borne in mind that if the securities are used or re-hypothecated by the secured creditor, the 
transaction is likely to be re-characterised as a repo. 
72 E. McKendrick, supra n. 3 at 65.  The argument was originally elaborated by Goode to explain the nature 
of an interest in a fund. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See on this point FMLC, Issue 1: Collateral Directive - Analysis of uncertainty regarding the meaning of “possession 
or control” and “excess financial collateral” under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003, 
December 2012 (hereafter ‘FMLC 2012’), at para. 2.05 and FMLC 2015 at paras. 1 – 5. 
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perfection requirements) than those introduced through the FCAR.  In particular, in its 
Report of December 2012 the FMLC states that Article 2(2) of the FCD should not be 
interpreted in the sense of allowing the debtor to exercise mere rights of substitution and 
withdrawal of excess collateral75.  The argument is confirmed by Briggs J in the decision 
of Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) in Administration where he emphasises that the 
final sentence of Article 2(2) of the FCD is not 'a comprehensive description of the rights 
which may [...] reside with the [debtor], such that the enjoyment by the [debtor] of any 
different or wider rights would be fatal to the requirement for [perfection of a security 
interest]".76 
The problem is to establish what other rights (apart from substitution and withdrawal 
of excess collateral) the debtor may be entitled to exercise.  The decision in Re Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) does not cast light on this aspect, although 
the general idea among practitioners seems to be in favour of allowing the debtor (i) to 
exercise voting right, (ii) to receive dividends or notices, (iii) to determine the value of the 
collateral or the secured obligations (e.g. in cases involving derivatives where the value of 
the obligation may fluctuate) and (iv) to obtain the return of the asset if the creditor 
becomes insolvent.  Indeed, by doing so, there is no breach of the requirements set out 
under Article 2(2) of the FCD given that although the debtor is allowed to monitor and 
enjoy the benefits of the collateral, he/she is still prevented from actually ‘disposing’ of 
the asset.  It is unfortunate that in its decision of November 2016 the CJEU does not 
clarify this point77.  
 
D.2 Floating charges and the unresolved debate on inclusion within the scope of 
the FCD 
 
What seems difficult to determine from the foregoing discussions is whether the security 
interest set out under the FCAR is to be characterised as a floating charge or as a fixed 
charge78.  
                                                 
75 FMLC 2012, at para. 2.10 n. 4.  
76 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at para. 132. 
77 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS [2016] EUECJ C-156/15 (10 November 2016).  The 
CJEU simply argues that a "right [of substitution or withdrawal] would lack any force if the taker of collateral 
consisting of monies deposited in an account were also to be regarded as having acquired 'possession or 
control' of the monies where the account holder may freely dispose of them".  Of course this argument is 
not inconsistent with the possibility that the debtor may continue to exercise voting rights, for example, or 
receive dividends.  Yet, a clarification on this point would have been advantageous.  For a detailed analysis 
of the specific rights that the debtor should maintain over the collateral see FMLC, 2012, at para. 2.12 and 
paras. 3.1 - 3.4. See also L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, supra n. 3 at para. 6–36 and S. 
Goldsworthy, “Taking possession and control to excess: issues with financial collateral arrangements under 
English law” (2013) J.I.B.F.L. 73.  
78 In the United Kingdom there was clearly an attempt to bring certain floating charges within the realm of 
the FCAR.  In particular, under Regulation 3 of the FCAR, it is stated that floating charges are included 
‘where the financial collateral charge is delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as 
to be in the possession or under the control of the collateral taker or a person acting on its behalf […].’ 
Furthermore, Regulations 8 and 10 of the FCAR are intended to disapply certain insolvency rules, which 
refer to floating charges and which, if applied, would restrict the enforcement of security interests in 
financial collateral (see s. 176 A Insolvency Act 1986; s. 245 Insolvency Act 1986; s. 754 Companies Act 
2006 and para. 70, Sch. B1, Insolvency Act 1986).  Despite the express reference to floating charges, the 
interpretation of these provisions is not very clear (as there is no precise indication of what level of 
possession or control must be exercised by the secured creditor in order for a floating charge to fall within 
the FCAR).  
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Typically, with a floating charge the debtor is free to dispose of the charged assets in 
the ordinary course of business.79   This means that floating charges may potentially 
prevent the secured creditor from being in ‘possession’ of the financial assets and as a 
result they should be placed outside the FCAR. 
However, the wording of Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR suggests that at least some 
floating charges are contemplated by the provision, i.e. those which merely allow the 
debtor to maintain a right to substitute financial collateral of the same or greater value or 
to withdraw excess financial collateral.  This argument is consistent with the decision of 
the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd80 which makes it clear that where the debtor is 
entitled to remove the collateral from the account without the consent of the secured 
creditor, “the charge should, in principle, be categorised as a floating charge”81.  The idea 
is that in these circumstances the secured assets “would have the circulating, ambulatory 
character distinctive of a floating charge”82 and cannot be treated stricto sensu as being part 
of a ‘blocked’ account.  This means that, following the decision in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd, 
only a total prohibition from all dealings can be considered sufficient to create a fixed 
charge.  To put it another way, it seems that not even limited rights such as a general 
power to substitute or withdraw excess financial collateral (which essentially ensures that 
the value of the collateral remains the same) is considered enough for the purpose of a 
fixed charge83.  This approach is in line with the view that a fixed charge has to attach to 
specific assets and that the secured creditor’s control needs to be in some way exclusive 
(meaning that it has to “relate to the assets themselves and not merely to their mere 
value”84).  One possible exception to this rule could be contemplated in those 
circumstances where the secured creditor’s consent is required each time the debtor 
intends to undertake a transaction to substitute or withdraw excess financial collateral. 
The problem then is that these types of agreements are rarely used in market practice 
given that in most cases the secured creditor’s consent is given in advance (i.e. at the 
moment of entering into the contract) rather than having to be granted specifically for 
every transaction85. 
 As a result of these considerations, it seems clear that the level of control (or 
possession) set out under the FCD is quite different from that required under English law 
when having to create a fixed charge.  
 
D.3 Is legal control alone sufficient to satisfy the perfection requirements? 
 
                                                 
79 A floating charge is a security interest over a pool of changing assets of the debtor, which ‘floats’ without 
attaching to any particular asset until it is ‘crystallised’ by attachment to specific assets. A fixed charge, by 
contrast, attaches to a particular asset immediately, or upon the debtor acquiring an interest in it.  The effect 
of such an attachment is that the debtor cannot deal with the asset free from the charge and needs to obtain 
the chargee’s permission if the asset is to be disposed of or transferred.  On the test to distinguish floating 
charges from fixed charges see e.g. Re Atlantic Computers Ltd [1992] (Ch) 505 (CA) and Re Cosslett (Contractors) 
Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 115.  However, the courts have experienced considerable difficulties in setting out a 
clear boundary between floating and fixed charges, particularly in the context of a charge over book debts.  
On this point, see Agnew v. IRC [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 A.C. 710 and National Westminster Bank v Spectrum 
Plus and others [2005] UKHL 41. 
80 [2005] UKHL 41. 
81 Ibid., para. 107. 
82 Ibid. at paras. 107 and 139.  
83 In support of this argument see L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit, supra n. 3, at paras. 4-02 – 4-
23; H. Beale “Non-Possessory Security” in H. Beale and others, supra n. 1, at para. 6.120 – 6.28; A. 
McKnight, “A review of 2010: part 2” (2011) 5 LFMR 95, at 96 – 97 and A. Zacaroli, supra n. 15, at 180 – 
182. For a different view see G. Yeowart and R. Parsons, The Law of Financial Collateral (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2016), at 8.120. 
84  H. Beale “Non-Possessory Security” in H. Beale and others, supra n. 1, at para. 6.127.  
85 The author is grateful to Habib Motani and Emma Chell for their views on this matter. 
  
16 
Another aspect which has been the subject of considerable attention in the United 
Kingdom concerns the opportunity of including within the scope of the FCAR the two 
combinations of (i) legal and negative control and (ii) legal, positive and negative control 
as valid methods of perfection. 
The leading position among practitioners seems to be in favour of introducing the 
notion of control (in addition to the one of possession) as a means of perfection of a 
security interest86.  In particular, the concept of control should contemplate the possibility 
where the collateral is on the account of the debtor, ‘but on terms which give a legal right 
to the [secured creditor] to ensure that it is dealt with in accordance with its directions’ 
(i.e. legal and negative control and legal, negative and positive control)87. 
In the absence of a statutory clarification on this point, Briggs J has recently attempted 
to analyse the exact meaning of control and has come to the conclusion that legal control 
without practical control is sufficient to perfect a security interest over financial 
collaterals.88   
 The author agrees with this position but feels that Briggs’ analysis does not fully explain 
the reasons why such an interpretation should be considered in line with the purpose of 
the FCD.  The truth is that there is nothing really explicit in the wording of the EU 
legislation that could lean in favour of supporting legal control alone.  However, if one 
looks carefully at the requirements for perfection set out (not only under Article 2(2) but 
also) under Recital 10 in the Preamble and under Article 1(5) one realises that such 
requirements can be considered satisfied when dealing with legal control alone.   
 Recital 10 states that the directive must provide a balance between market efficiency 
on the one hand and the safety of the parties in regard to the arrangement and third parties 
on the other.  Such a balance, continues Recital 10, can only be achieved if the financial 
collateral arrangement provides for some form of dispossession that needs to be 
“evidenced in writing or in a durable medium, thereby ensuring the traceability emphasis 
added of the collateral”89.   The meaning of traceability is clarified in Article 1(5) of the 
FCD when it emphasises that “the evidencing of dispossession … must allow for the 
identification of the financial collateral to which it applies”90.  The objective of this 
provision is clearly to ensure that third parties are placed in a position which allows them 
to somehow locate the collateral and be aware of the existence of the security interest, 
hence avoiding the risk of fraud by one of the parties.  Article 1(5) of the FCD goes even 
                                                 
86 See FMLC 2012 at para. 2.12. 
87 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at para. 136.  Once 
again, the CJEU does not answer this question in its decision of November 2016 (as the facts of the case 
relate to a rather different scenario, which simply involves cash deposited in a bank account).  The only 
point concerning Article 2(2) of the FCD which was clarified by the CJEU is that for the purpose of 
‘possession or control’ the secured creditor needs to be in a position to “dispose of the collateral when an 
enforcement event occurs” and that such an outcome can only be achieved if the debtor is actually 
prevented from using the collateral (Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS [2016] EUECJ C-
156/15, paras. 41 – 44).  This, however, is only confirming the idea that the creditor needs to achieve 
negative control, as positive control alone is not sufficient.  See supra text to nn. 29 and 30. 
88 Ibid. at paras. 131 - 132.  Nevertheless, the combinations involving legal and negative control cannot be 
interpreted too restrictively, as the debtor should be entitled to exercise certain limited rights over the 
collateral.  This means that (consistent with the interpretation proposed on the notion of possession) the 
debtor may be allowed, for example, to receive dividends or exercise voting rights, without this conduct 
preventing the secured creditor from having control over the collateral, Ibid. Similarly, the composition of 
the collateral portfolio can be subject to adjustment by granting the debtor the power to substitute and 
withdraw excess collateral, FMLC 2012 at paras. 2.9 – 3.4.  Once again, in this case control is not considered 
jeopardised (to the extent that the secured creditor is in a position to effectively verify the debtor's activity 
over the collateral). 
89 Recital 10 in the Preamble to the FCD. 
90 Art. 1(5) FCD. 
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further by stating that “for this purpose, it is sufficient to prove that the collateral has 
been credited to … the … account” of the secured creditor91.  In other words, it is 
sufficient to show that the secured creditor has obtained practical and legal control.  But 
what is exactly meant by the expression “it is sufficient”?  
There are two ways of interpreting this wording.  
The first possibility (which is the one preferred by the author) is based on the idea that 
the combination involving practical and legal control (i.e. possession) should not be 
regarded as the only condition for perfection but merely as a minimum standard that 
should be provided for under national legislation92. This means that (for the purpose of 
the directive) Member States are left with the discretion to choose whether or not to 
introduce additional methods of perfection (other than practical and legal control), 
provided that such methods can (i) ensure the dispossession of the collateral as described 
under Article 2(2) of the FCD and (ii) allow third parties to be informed about the 
existence of the security interest (as stated under Recital 10 in the Preamble and under 
Article 1(5) of the FCD).  The question remains, can legal control alone satisfy such 
requirements? This article suggests that it is capable of doing so (despite the fact that the 
collateral remains credited on the debtor’s account).   
 Legal control can be obtained either by reaching a three party contract among the 
intermediary, the debtor and the creditor (i.e. by way of a ‘control agreement) or, 
alternatively, by earmarking the existence of the security interest on the debtor’s account 
(i.e. by way of a ‘designating entry’).  In both cases the dispossession requirement (defined 
under Article 2(2) of the FCD) seems to be achieved, given that the debtor has no right 
to dispose of the asset (other than to substitute or withdraw excess collateral)93. On the 
other hand, it can be more difficult to prove the fulfilment of the notification requirement 
(established under Recital 10 of the Preamble and under Article 1(5) of the FCD).  Indeed, 
when looking at the two options the most obvious reaction would be to exclude the 
possibility of ‘tracing’ or ‘identifying’ the collateral in the case of a control agreement.  The 
reason for this is that a control agreement, unlike a designating entry, is a ‘private matter’ 
between the contracting parties and hence is not ‘visible’ on any account statement, nor 
to any persons authorised to review such an account.  As a result, only a designating 
entry offers an element of transparency, i.e. the visibility of the existence of this interest 
within the IT system of the intermediary or within the statement account.  Thus, third 
parties wishing to create a security interest over those assets may discover the existence 
of a previously created security interest when obtaining an account statement. 
 However, a closer look at the practice of intermediated securities shows that 
traceability is not necessarily linked to visibility.  If the purpose of traceability is to identify 
the asset as it passes from one person to another (including those circumstances where 
the debtor grants a charge to the creditor) it is possible to argue that the same objective 
can be achieved by way of a control agreement (despite its lack of transparency).  
Interestingly, in the United Kingdom control agreements are used by market 
participants more frequently than designating entries. In this case, the general view is that 
the intermediary (being a party to the control agreement) can disclose the existence of a 
security interest to third parties and by doing so, is in a position to prevent the risk of 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 As stated in Recital 22 of the Preamble the aim of the FCD is to “create a minimum regime relating to 
the use of financial collateral”. This means that the directive “does not go beyond what is necessary in order 
to achieve that objective”.  See on this point   Briggs J in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In 
Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at para. 92. 
93 Of course, in these cases it is the responsibility of the debtor’s own intermediary to make sure that such 
a condition is respected, but ultimately in the practice of intermediated securities any transaction will depend 
on the reliability of the intermediary.  
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fraud by the debtor.  Let us imagine, for example, that on day 1 X grants a charge to Y 
covering all securities, credited into his/her account with D-Bank.  For this purpose, on 
day 2 X and Y conclude a control agreement under the participation of D-Bank where D-
Bank agrees to block the securities in the account and only release them in accordance 
with the directions of Y.  If then on day 3 X decides to transfer those same securities to 
Z, D-Bank will be under an obligation not to proceed with such a transaction (without 
prior authorisation by Y).  Although in this case there is no visible perception of the 
existence of charges on the debtor’s account, it is possible to argue that Z is deemed in 
any event to identify the collateral and therefore to receive ‘notice’.94 
In this context, it could be argued that the ‘invisibility’ of control agreements 
strengthens the dependence of third parties on the reliability of the intermediary.  This is, 
however, considered a weak point given that (regardless of the method used in practice) 
third parties cannot check on the account without the authorisation of the intermediary 
and “account statements can be outdated within hours” bearing in mind the large number 
of transactions that are usually made for each account on a daily basis95. 
For these reasons, it seems clear that legal control alone (obtained either by way of a 
control agreement or a designating entry) complies with the perfection requirements set 
out under the FCD.  Hence, Member States may choose whether they intend to introduce 
within their national legislation legal control alone as a valid method of perfection (in 
addition to the combination involving legal and practical control).  
There is, however, another way of explaining the second part of Article 1(5) of the 
FCD which would result in excluding legal control alone as a valid method of perfection 
and in considering the combination involving legal and practical control as the only 
alternative to registration.  Such an outcome could be obtained by interpreting the FCD 
as stating that (for the purpose of identifying the collateral) no formal act (such as 
registration in a public register) is required, as it is sufficient emphasis added to transfer 
the asset on the account of the secured creditor. This interpretation, however, is not very 
convincing for two main reasons.  Firstly, if the intention of the directive was to place 
legal and practical control as a condicio sine qua non for perfection, the drafting would have 
been more definitive and less ambiguous.  Secondly (and more importantly), the 
European Commission has recently acknowledged the importance of recognising in cross 
border transactions the possibility of creating a security interest while allowing the debtor 
to retain the collateral in his/her account.  In particular, during the negotiation process 
for the drafting of a new legislation on intermediated securities (Securities Law Legislation 
- SLL) the European Commission confirms the idea that while the combination involving 
legal and practical control forms the “minimum common denominator that should be 
generally provided for under any law”96, Member States have the option of choosing (a) 
whether to add legal control alone as a method of perfection and, if so (b) whether such 
                                                 
94 A completely different outcome arises if the control agreement is reached merely between the debtor and 
the creditor (without the involvement of the intermediary). In this case, the existence of a charge will not 
be notified to third parties (other than through the information provided by the debtor).  For these reasons 
there is a significant exposure to the risk of fraud which places these types of agreements outside the FCD 
(being in contrast with Recital 10 in the Preamble). The author is grateful to Habib Motani and Emma Chell 
for these considerations. 
95 P. Paech, Cross-border issues of securities law: European efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal 
framework, European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, May 2011 at para. 5.3.3. 
See on this point also H. Kanda and others, Official Commentary on the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive 
Rules for Intermediated Securities (OUP 2012) at para. 12.30.  However, one valid argument against control 
agreements is that an “obligation to make a designating entry would force the intermediary to strengthen 
the processes managing the various security interests it administers”, ibid. 
96 European Commission, Consultation Document of the Services of the Directorate- General Internal Market and 
Services on Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities Holding and Dispositions, 2010, para. 4.2. 
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a method should be achieved by way of a designating entry and/or by way of a control 
agreement.  
The position adopted by the European Commission on legal control alone has been 
for the most part welcomed by the different Member States97.  Yet, it has raised key issues 
which have not been covered by the FCD and which require urgent clarification.  The 
most important point is to set out the criteria that determine in cases of insolvency, the 
order of priority among competing charges over the same assets. In other words, should 
priority be based on the type of method used to obtain perfection or should changes be 
simply ranked based on when each of them has become effective (i.e., first in time priority 
rule)?98   
The absence of a clear answer on this point may have severe repercussions on the use 
of secured transactions and, hence, may defeat the purpose of the FCD to ensure the 
ready transferability of investment securities. 
The working programme of the European Commission for 2016 does not include the 
SLL and therefore it seems likely that no further development on this project can be 
expected in the near future.  At this point, it is to be hoped that at least the part of this 
project related to secured transactions will soon be introduced through either national 
legislation or an amendment to the FCD. 
 
D.4 Towards a statutory reform? 
 
The extensive and ongoing debate over the meaning of possession and control seems to 
be proceeding in the direction of recognising in the United Kingdom at least four different 
combinations of control: (i) practical, legal, negative and positive control; (ii) practical, 
legal and negative control; (iii) legal and negative control and (iv) legal, positive and 
negative control.  Of these combinations the first two coincide with the new definition of 
possession provided by Regulation 3 (2) of the FCARs, while the last two should most 
likely be included in the notion of control.  While Regulation 3 (2) FCAR and the decision 
in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) In Administration) have contributed to clarify the 
perfection requirements in financial collateral arrangements, there is still some degree of 
uncertainty concealed in the existing legal framework.   
These considerations have recently brought the FMLC to propose an amendment of 
Regulation 3 (2) of the FCAR so as to allow a less restrictive interpretation of the meaning 
of possession over intangibles and the introduction of the concept of control (broadly 
along the lines of the decision in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) In Administration).  
                                                 
97 See European Commission, Summary of Responses to the Directorate-General Internal Market and Services. Second 
Consultation. Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities Holding and Dispositions, 2011. 
98 The debate during the negotiation process focused essentially on whether the “interests in book-entry 
securities, which are acquired by [designating entry] have priority over interests acquired in the same book-
entry by means of a control agreement […],” Recommendation 8, Legal Certainty Group, Solutions to Legal 
Barriers related to Post trading within the EU, Second Advice, August 2008, 64.  The main argument in favour 
of introducing a preferable treatment for designating entries is that “visibility” facilitates allocating positions 
and possibly transferring positions from a member to another in case of failures”.  This position, however, 
has been criticised by certain Member States on the basis that both methods (i.e. designating entries and 
control agreements) depend on the reliability of the intermediary. Hence, “if it does not comply with its 
book-keeping rules, the designating entry would not help” in any case, P. Paech, Cross-border issues of securities 
law, supra n. 94, at para. 5.3.3. As for the combination involving legal and practical control, it has been stated 
that “crediting and debiting are not included within the scope of the priority provisions”, European 
Commission, Consultation Document, supra n. 95, at para. 9.2. For a critical analysis on this last point see 
AFME, Replies to the Consultation Document of the Services of the Directorate- General Internal Market and Services on 
Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities Holding and Dispositions, December 2010, at para. 9.  See also Articles 
18 and 19 of the UNIDROIT Convention on substantive legal rules regarding securities held through 
securities accounts (Geneva, 2009). 
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The overall intention is to strengthen the rights that the debtor may retain over the 
collateral as well as accommodating English law to the practice developed in other 
jurisdictions.99  In this regard, the HM Treasury has recently expressed its intention of 
giving further consideration to a possible amendment of the FCAR100 and of evaluating 
the FMLC's proposal to revise the meaning of possession as well as introduce the notion 
of control (in addition to that of possession)101. 
 
D.5. Will Brexit have an impact on the FCAR? 
 
 To conclude section D of this paper, it is worth considering what effects there will be 
on the FCAR when the United Kingdom ceases to be a member of the European Union.  
Indeed, following the decision made by the British people to leave the European Union 
(better known as the ‘Brexit decision’)102, it is expected that in two years' time (i.e. by the 
end of March 2019) the United Kingdom will no longer be required to comply with EU 
Treaties and laws103.  The decision, however, will not have an immediate impact on the 
FCAR which will continue to be applied, unless the United Kingdom decides to either 
repeal or amend such legislation.104 
A decision to repeal the FCAR is quite remote, as there is a strong interest among 
market participants (especially among those trading derivatives) to maintain the key 
principles set out under the FCAR.  The reason for this is that such principles play an 
important role in facilitating the flow of capital and providing quicker access to liquidity.  
Yet, there is a possibility of certain provisions being amended, since the HM Treasury 
is already considering the FMLC’s proposal to increase the number of exemptions to the 
registration requirements.  Clearly, according to exactly when the United Kingdom ceases 
                                                 
99 See on this point FMLC 2012 at paras. 2.10.  
100 HM Treasury, Consultation Paper, Implementation of EU Directive 2009/44/EC on settlement finality and 
financial collateral arrangements, November 2010 at para. 2.21 and HM Treasury, August 2010 at paras. 3.3 – 
3.6. 
101 The FMLC was involved in discussions with the HM Treasury on the opportunity to amend Regulation 
3 (2) of the FCAR.  These discussions resulted in the FMLC agreeing to submit evidence on the impact 
that the uncertainties surrounding the FCAR may have on the wholesale financial markets.  The FMCL 
collected evidence of such impact and in 2015 published a report that is now being evaluated by the HM 
Treasury.  See on this point FMLC 2015.  
102 On 23rd of June 2016 the United Kingdom held a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European 
Union.  The majority of British people voted to leave the European Union and (as a result of this) on 29 
March 2017 the UK Government started the process of withdrawal, set out under Article 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union (‘TEU’).  This means that in two years’ time the UK will cease to be a member of the 
European Union and hence will no longer be obliged to follow EU laws. 
103 The decision to leave the European Union will have the effect of repealing the European Communities 
Act 1972 (hereafter ‘ECA’), which sets out the supremacy of EU law.  For further details on this point see 
the Government announcement on the so-called Great Repeal Bill, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-end-of-european-communities-act.  
104 As a general rule, EC Directives require implementation into the United Kingdom through legislation 
from the UK Parliament. This means that, following the entry into force of the FCAR, the principles set 
out under the FCD have become an integral part of national legislation. Hence, after withdrawing from the 
European Union, the FCAR would automatically continue to apply.  A different procedure, on the other 
hand, should (at least in principle) be used as regards EU regulations, given that the latter are implemented 
directly within Member States, without the need for national legislation.  In this case, EU regulations would 
no longer be binding in the United Kingdom and it would therefore be necessary to consider the 
implementation of new legislation to fill any gaps.  However, in order to avoid situations of legal uncertainty, 
the Government has recently announced that the Great Repeal Bill, which will come into effect when the 
UK ceases to be a member of the EU, will contain provisions aimed at incorporating (i.e. transposing) the 
bulk of EU Regulations into domestic law.  This will not of course prevent the UK from subsequently 
“reviewing all EU related-legislation, as well as that which will be transposed by the Great Repeal Bill” 
and deciding whether to (i) repeal, (ii) maintain or (iii) amend each piece of such legislation.  See on this 
point http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7793.  
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to be a member of the European Union, then such a proposal must be evaluated without 
having to consider whether or not it is in line with the scope and objectives of the FCD.105  
It would be completely up to the United Kingdom to decide where to strike the delicate 
balance between market efficiency on the one hand and safeguarding the parties from risk 
of fraud on the other.  
 
E. Does control or possession comply with ‘publicity’ requirements? 
 
 Recent developments in the meanings of both possession and control bring us to 
evaluate whether such concepts are reasonably consistent with the requirement of public 
notice, typically associated to the perfection of a security interest. 
The answer to this query is that the practice of indirectly held securities functions in a 
way that prevents control and possession from providing public notice [emphasis added].  
The reason for this is that transfers of indirectly held securities are made in the same way 
as bank funds transfers and therefore, third parties have no access to the account without 
the authorization of the holder of that account.  The next question then to be posed is, 
to what extent can possession or control over financial collaterals be considered valid 
methods of perfection of a security interest? 
Article 2(2) of the FCD can be given two different interpretations.  The first one is to 
consider this provision simply as an exception to the perfection requirements, along the 
lines of other cases set out in the Companies Act 2006106 and in the Banking Act 2009107.  
These circumstances are characterised by the fact that once the security interest is created, 
no further steps must be taken to ensure that such interest is effective against third parties.  
In other words, these types of security interest are exempted from registration simply on 
the grounds of policy considerations (without any effort on the part of the secured 
creditor).108  This interpretation, however, raises certain reservations given that (unlike the 
latter cases) Article 2(2) of the FCD does require the secured creditor to undertake specific 
actions (i.e. the transfer of control or possession) in order to avoid registration.  More 
importantly, the objective of such actions is clearly to ensure some form of publicity, 
which means the disclosure of the security interest, if not to the world at large, at least to 
certain categories of third parties (mainly, potential subsequent secured creditors or 
buyers of the collateral).  Hence, the correct way to explain Article 2(2) of the FCD would 
be to consider the transfer of control or possession (from the debtor to the creditor) as a 
form of perfection which does not necessarily involve the same level of publicity 
conceived for registration.109   
                                                 
105 However, it is worth mentioning that the proposal to consider legal control alone as a valid method of 
perfection was valued by Briggs J. in the decision of Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) In Administration) 
[2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) as being in line with the wording of the directive. 
106 Sections 859A (6) (a) and (b) of the Companies Act 2006. 
107 Section 252 Banking Act 2009. 
108 In the United States these cases would probably be regarded as forms of ‘automatic’ perfection but in 
English law they are more likely to be considered as types of security interest that do not need to be 
perfected.  This is emphasised by Beale when he states that the concept of perfection does not necessarily 
apply in the same manner in all legal systems.  For example, unlike Article 9 UCC, in English law there is 
no general requirement of perfection, given that ‘only certain types of security interest need to be perfected’, 
H. Beale “Registration and Other Perfection Requirements” in H. Beale and others, supra n. 1, at para. 9.03.  
For an extensive analysis on this point see ibid, at paras. 9.03 - 9.23 and L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems 
of Credit, supra n. 3, at paras. 2.16 – 2.21.  
109 A different position has been set out by Bridge who views possession and control over financial 
collaterals as an exception to the perfection requirements, M. G. Bridge, “The Law Commission’s Proposals 
for the Reform of Corporate Security Interests” in J. Getzler and J. Payne Company Charges: Spectrum and 
Beyond (OUP 2006) at 267 - 290. 
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The rationale behind this argument is that perfection is usually designed to 
provide some form of notice to third parties and that by third parties it is not necessarily 
intended the world at large but only those categories of persons which have access to 
financial markets.  This (non-rigorous) definition of perfection is in line with Articles 9 
and 8 of the UCC whose main purpose (when determining whether a notice is ‘sufficient’) 
is to ensure market efficiency, at the expense of no longer taking into 
consideration the interest of certain classes of persons (mainly unsecured creditors who 
in the absence of a registration requirement, would be unaware of the existence of 
a security interest).110  
In this complex scenario, one could argue that for the purposes of 'perfection' different 
levels of notice can be provided to third parties, depending on the type of collateral 
involved (i.e. whether or not it is included within the scope of the FCD).  The different 
degrees of notice may increase even further, depending on the kind of method used to 
actually transfer possession and control over financial collaterals.  More specifically, the 
method stated under Regulation 3 (2) FCAR is the strongest form of notice that can be 
provided to third parties when perfecting a security interest over indirectly held 
securities.  Indeed, transferring the collateral onto the creditor’s account and 
preventing the debtor from disposing of the collateral is probably the closest one could 
get to the traditional meaning of 'possession'.  This means that the creditor is in a position 
to closely monitor the assets, with the result of avoiding the risk of competing claims.111 
On the other hand, when the secured creditor acquires merely legal control, the 
collateral remains credited in the account of the debtor and consequently, the level of 
notice provided to third parties is somewhat more limited than that offered under 
Regulation 3 (2) FCARs.  This is clearly stated by Thèvenoz when he argues that with 
legal control alone a third party (e.g. a potential secured lender) 'has no way of assessing 
the existence, value and availability of the assets in the accounts other than to rely on the 
information disclosed by the [debtor’s] intermediary'.112  In this particular case, the degree 
of notice may continue to vary depending on whether legal control is achieved through a 
designating entry or simply a control agreement.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, with a 
designating entry the existence of a charge is ‘earmarked’ on the debtor’s account (and 
therefore is to some extent visible to third parties), while with a control agreement the 
disclosure of the security interest is ensured merely through the information provided by 
the debtor’s intermediary to third parties. 
In the light of these considerations, the concept of perfection needs to be partially 
reconsidered, as it does not seem to be constantly associated with actions that provide 
‘public’ notice to third parties.  Nowadays, the idea is that 'perfection' can provide 
different forms of notice, which may vary from time to time in terms of (i) number 
or categories of persons against whom such a notice is addressed and (ii) facility in getting 
access to the information concerning the security agreement.113  
Once again, this position is consistent with the historical development of certain 
concepts of English property law.  More specifically, if courts and scholars generally 
accept the idea that over the centuries English law has developed different levels of 
                                                 
110 On this point, concerns were raised by the HM Treasury which highlights the importance of balancing 
market efficiency on the one hand and the safety of third parties, on the other (as stated in Recital 10 in the 
Preamble of the FCD), HM Treasury, August 2010 at para. 3.3.  
111 Of course, this would be the case only under the assumption that the intermediary acts honestly and 
professionally and carefully follows the instructions given by the secured party.  
112 L. Thévenoz, “Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International Harmonisation of Commercial 
Law” (2008) 13 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 384 at 443. 
113 Such facility will depend on whether such information is located on the creditor’s or on the debtor’s 
account (and in the latter case, on whether it can be accessed through a designating entry or a control 
agreement).  
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ownership (i.e. legal and equitable) and more recently even different levels of possession 
(depending on whether this concept entails an exclusive or non-exclusive dominium over 
the asset)114, there is nothing to prevent them from also recognising different levels of 
notice for the purpose of perfection.   
The common thread among all these concepts is clearly the tendency to address market 
needs by softening (or maybe sometimes even blurring) the purpose and key features of 
well-established principles of property law.   
 
F. Conclusions 
 
The article centres around the four main questions raised at the beginning of our 
discussion, mainly (i) what is the precise meaning of control? (ii) does the FCD provide a 
clear definition of this new concept? (iii) what is the solution adopted in the UK (iv) does 
the new method of perfection (envisaged for financial collateral arrangements) offer 
sufficient notice to third parties? 
The conclusions drawn from this analysis are that firstly there is no single or absolute 
definition of control, as this concept comprises at least seven different forms, whose 
content is liable to change depending on the intention of the parties: (i) practical, legal, 
negative and positive control; (ii) practical, negative and positive control; (iii) practical, 
legal and positive control; (iv) practical, legal and negative control; (v) legal and positive 
control; (vi) legal and negative control and (vii) legal, positive and negative control. 
Secondly, unlike other jurisdictions, only four seem to be consistent with the scope of 
the FCD, i.e. (i) practical, legal, negative and positive control, (ii) practical, legal and 
negative control, (iii) legal and negative control and (iv) legal, positive and negative 
control. 
Thirdly, the United Kingdom has interpreted the FCD quite restrictively, having 
included (under the FCAR) only the first two combinations as valid methods of 
perfection.  In addition, it has chosen to avoid introducing the concept of control by 
including such combinations within the notion of possession.  This solution does not 
seem to comply with the orthodox view that rigorously confines the concept of 
possession to tangibles.  The resulting effect has been to create two meanings of 
possession, depending on the nature of the asset involved (whether tangible or intangible).  
More specifically, when applied to investment property, possession cannot be defined in 
terms of absolute or exclusive dominium over the securities, given that the portfolio of 
assets (forming part of the collateral) may change from time to time (provided that its 
overall value remains unchanged).  In this regard, the definition of possession set out 
under Regulation 3 (2) FCAR seems to recall Roy Goode’s description of an interest in a 
fund where such fund is considered as having ‘an identity distinct from its component 
parts’.115 
In recent years, there has been significant pressure in market practice to introduce a 
concept of control (in addition to the one of possession).  In this regard, especially now 
in the aftermath of Brexit, it will be interesting to see whether the United Kingdom will 
decide to amend the existing legal framework and recognise new forms of exemptions 
from the registration requirements that are not currently contemplated by the FCAR. 
The last point concerns the need to determine whether the new idea of possession and 
control complies with the publicity requirements and, if not, whether it can still be 
considered a valid method of perfection.  The analysis of the practice of indirectly held 
securities has shown that perfection is not necessarily designed to provide notice to the 
public at large (in the sense of everyone in the world) but only to those categories of 
                                                 
114 See infra text to nn. 64 and 74. 
115 E. McKendrick, supra n. 3 at 65. 
  
24 
persons who have access to this type of market.  This means that there can be different 
degrees of notice, depending on the asset involved and the type of method chosen by the 
parties to perfect a security agreement. 
It is apparent from this discussion that the FCD has caused the United Kingdom to 
stretch the boundaries of traditional principles of property law (particularly, those of 
possession and perfection, that can no longer be interpreted in strict or absolute terms).  
Nowadays, the main perception is that there can be different forms of possession as well 
as different forms of publicity, which may vary on each occasion, depending on the nature 
of the collateral and the intention of the parties. Although this approach may appear to 
constitute a break from certain traditional principles of law, it does confirm the view 
(generally recognized among academics when explaining the law of trust) that English law 
has developed a ‘flexible’ and ‘malleable’ idea of property116 which has proven capable of 
adapting to, and effectively addressing the continuing changes in market practice.  
 
                                                 
116 The terms ‘flexible’ and ‘malleable’ are used by James Penner in relation to the concept 
of property.  On this point see J. Penner The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property 
(1996) UCLA Law Review 43, 771, at 773. 
